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Abstract
This note examines the effort choice problem of a decision maker (DM) who has to meet
a target. The more the DM spends on effort, the more likely the target is reached. Besides
the risk of missing the target despite his effort, the DM faces additional uncertainty in that
both the target and the status quo are subject to exogenous shocks that are beyond the
DM’s control. We consider two cases: the additive case in which the DM’s effort affects
solely the likelihood of achieving the target, and the multiplicative case in which the DM’s
effort also has direct effect on the target and the status quo. Using the theory of monotone
comparative statics and risk apportionment, we derive sufficient conditions under which
the DM spends more on effort when the target experiences an improvement in risk via
higher-order stochastic dominance.
JEL classification: C61; D81
Keywords: Effort; Monotone comparative statics; Risk apportionment; Risky targets;
Stochastic dominance
1. Introduction
In a recent article in this Journal, Chuang et al. (2013) examine the effort choice problem
of a decision maker (DM) who has a target to meet. The more the DM spends on effort,
the more likely the target is reached.1 Besides the risk of missing the target despite his
effort, the DM faces additional uncertainty in that both the target and the status quo are
subject to exogenous shocks that are beyond the DM’s control. Chuang et al. (2013) focus
on the comparative statics with respect to the DM’s optimal effort when there are changes
in risk that influence either the target or the status quo. Crainich et al. (2016) extend their
analysis to allow for different risk attitudes including not only risk aversion but also risk
1The effort choice problem of Chuang et al. (2013) is analogous to the self-protection problem of Ehrlich
and Becker (1972). While effort is chosen to enhance the likelihood of a positive outcome in the former
problem, it is chosen to reduce the occurrence of a negative event in the latter problem.
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neutrality and risk loving.
Examples of the effort choice problem considered by Chuang et al. (2013) abound.
For instance, firms innovate by incurring R&D expenditures to improve their products.
New products are more likely to be launched, consequently making the existing products
obsolete, should firms spend more on R&D. In the worse case scenario when innovations fail,
firms still have their existing products for sales. Of course, the actual demand for either the
new or existing products is not completely predictable ex ante, thereby exposing the target
and the status quo to substantial uncertainty. As another example, portfolio managers
are commonly required to beat some benchmark returns either explicitly or implicitly. To
this end, they spend resources to construct plausible trading strategies that might generate
abnormal returns. If no such trading strategies are found, portfolio managers can still invest
in the benchmark portfolios. In either case, the portfolio returns are influenced by market
conditions and sentiments, making both the target and the status quo risky.
The purpose of this note is twofold. First, as in Crainich et al. (2016), we derive sufficient
conditions under which the DM spends more on effort when the target experiences an
improvement in risk in the sense of higher-order stochastic dominance. While Chuang et al.
(2013) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this comparative statics exercise, their
conditions depend on endogenously chosen variables, thereby substantially reducing their
usefulness. Unlike Chuang et al. (2013) and Crainich et al. (2016), both of which rely on the
first- and second-order conditions for the DM’s effort choice problem, we apply the theory
of monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) and risk apportionment
(Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006; Eeckhoudt et al., 2009; Chiu et al., 2012) to perform
the comparative statics analysis. This approach follows that of Wang and Li (2015), which
shows that precautionary effort a` la Eeckhoudt et at. (2012) is another trait for prudence.2
Indeed, Nocetti (2016) offers a rather general setting with one or more decision variables to
study the comparative statics of higher-degree risk changes, which is applicable to generalize
2Wong (2016) extends the analysis of Wang and Li (2015) to the case of precautionary self-insurance-
cum-protection.
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many classical theories such as precautionary saving and self-protection.
Second, we consider not only the additive case in which the DM’s effort affects solely the
likelihood of achieving the target (Chuang et al., 2013; Crainich et al., 2016), but also the
multiplicative case in which the DM’s effort has direct effect on the target and the status
quo. The idea is that while the target and the status quo may be measured by means
of lump-sum stochastic returns as in the additive case, they may very well be measured
by means of per-dollar stochastic returns as in the multiplicative case. The examples of
innovative firms and portfolio managers mentioned above fall squarely into the additive and
multiplicative cases, respectively.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a variant model of
Chuang et al. (2013). Section 3 derives sufficient conditions under which the DM spends
more on effort when the target becomes less risky via higher-order stochastic dominance
in the additive case. Section 4 extends the analysis to the multiplicative case. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
Consider a variant model of risky targets and effort a` la Chuang et al. (2013). A
decision maker (DM) has initial wealth, w0 > 0, and a continuously differentiable utility
function, u(w), defined over his terminal wealth, w > 0. Let T be a positive integer and
define UT ≡ {u(w) : (−1)
n−1u(n)(w) > 0 for n = 1, ..., T}, where u(n)(w) = dnu(w)/dwn
denotes the nth derivative of u(w). Hence, UT is the set of utility functions that satisfy risk
apportionment up to order T (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006). Letting T go to infinity
imposes u(w) to have all odd derivatives positive and all even derivatives negative. In this
case, u(w) is completely monotone and exhibits mixed risk aversion (Caballe´ and Pomansky,
1996).
The DM faces an original risky situation, b˜, but he prefers to face an alternative risky
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situation, a˜, to which we refer as his target. Both a˜ and b˜ are positive continuous random
variables such that E[u(a˜)] > E[u(b˜)], where E[·] is the expectation operator. To make
it more likely to reach the target, the DM can spend an amount, e, on effort, where the
expenditure, e, is endogenously chosen from the compact set, [0, w0].
3 Given that e has
been spent, the probability of achieving the target is p(e) and that of remaining at the
original situation is 1 − p(e), where p(e) is a continuous function such that 0 ≤ p(e) ≤ 1.
We assume that the DM’s effort is effective in that p(e) is increasing in e for all e ∈ [0, w0].
Let F (a) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a˜ over support [a, a], where
0 ≤ a < a. Define F1(a) = F (a) and Fn+1(a) =
∫ a
a Fn(x)dx for all n = 1, ..., N − 1 and
a ∈ [a, a], where N ≥ 2. Let a˜′ be another random variable that is distributed according to
the CDF,G(a), over support [a, a]. Define Gn(a) in an analogous manner as Fn(a) for n = 1,
..., N . We say that a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance if Gn(a) ≤ Fn(a)
for all n = 1, ..., N , and GN(a) ≤ FN(a) for all a ∈ [a, a], where the inequality is strict for
some a. In the special case wherein Gn(a) = Fn(a) for all n = 1, ..., N , the first N − 1
moments of the two distributions coincide. In this case, we say that a˜ has more N th-degree
risk than a˜′ in the sense of Ekern (1980).
3. Additive risky targets and effort
As in Chuang et al. (2013), we consider in this section the case that the risky target
and status quo are additive in nature so that the DM’s expected utility is given by
f(e) = p(e)E[u(w0− e + a˜)] + [1− p(e)]E[u(w0− e+ b˜)], (1)
The DM’s ex-ante decision problem is to choose e ∈ [0, w0] so as to maximize f(e). Since
f(e) is a continuous function of e, the set, argmaxe∈[0,w0] f(e), is non-empty, and plausibly
not a singleton. Let e∗1 be an element in argmaxe∈[0,w0] f(e).
3An alternative way is to specify the effort cost as disutility (see Chuang et al., 2013). In this case, it is
easily verified that the results of Propositions 1 and 2 remain intact.
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Following Chuang et al. (2013), we conduct the comparative statics with respect to
the DM’s optimal effort when the risky target, a˜, changes to a˜′, where a˜′ dominates a˜
via N th-order stochastic dominance and N ≥ 1. In this case, the DM’s expected utility
becomes
g(e) = p(e)E[u(w0− e+ a˜
′)] + [1− p(e)]E[u(w0− e+ b˜)]. (2)
The DM’s ex-ante decision problem is to choose e ∈ [0, w0] so as to maximize g(e). Since
g(e) is a continuous function of e, the set, argmaxe∈[0,w0] g(e), is non-empty, and plausibly
not a singleton. Let e∗2 be an element in argmaxe∈[0,w0] g(e).
To examine the DM’s optimal effort when the target becomes less risky, we have to
compare the two sets, argmaxe∈[0,w0] f(e) and argmaxe∈[0,w0] g(e). This falls into a principal
concern in the theory of monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). The
following well-known theorem is adapted from Topkis (1978, 1998).
Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem. If the function, φ(e, θ), satisfies the single-crossing
condition in (e, θ), i.e.,
φ(e2, θ1)− φ(e1, θ1) ≥ 0⇒ φ(e2, θ2)− φ(e1, θ2) > 0, (3)
for all e2 > e1 and θ2 > θ1, then e
∗
θ2
≥ e∗θ1 for all θ2 > θ1, where e
∗
θ ∈ argmaxe∈[0,w0] φ(e, θ).
Proof. Since e∗θ ∈ argmaxe∈[0,w0] φ(e, θ), we must have φ(e
∗
θ1
, θ1)− φ(e
∗
θ2
, θ1) ≥ 0. Suppose
that e∗θ1 > e
∗
θ2
, where θ2 > θ1. It then follows from the single-crossing condition (3) that
φ(e∗θ1 , θ2)− φ(e
∗
θ2
, θ2) > 0, which is contradictory to e
∗
θ2
∈ argmaxe∈[0,w0] φ(e, θ2). Hence, it
must be true that e∗θ2 ≥ e
∗
θ1
for all θ2 > θ1. 2
In the following proposition, we derive sufficient, but not necessary, conditions under
which the DM spends more on effort when the target becomes less risky, i.e., e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1.
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Proposition 1. Given that the risky situations are additive in nature, and that the risky
target, a˜, experiences an improvement in risk to a˜′ via N th-order stochastic dominance,
the DM spends more on effort, i.e., e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1, if the DM’s utility function satisfies that
u(w) ∈ UN+1.
Proof. Define f(e) = φ(e, 1) and g(e) = φ(e, 2). For all e2 > e1, it follows from Eq. (1) that
f(e2)− f(e1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
p(e2)E[u(w0− e2 + a˜)]− p(e1)E[u(w0− e1 + a˜)]
≥ [1− p(e1)]E[u(w0− e1 + b˜)]− [1− p(e2)]E[u(w0− e2 + b˜)]. (4)
Since a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance and w0 − e1 dominates w0 − e2
via first-order stochastic dominance, Theorem 3 of Eeckhoudt et al. (2009) implies that
the 50-50 binary lottery, [w0 − e2 + a˜
′;w0 − e1 + a˜], dominates the 50-50 binary lottery,
[w0 − e1 + a˜
′;w0 − e2 + a˜], via (N + 1)th-order stochastic dominance. Since u(w) ∈ UN+1,
it follows from the (N + 1)th-order stochastic dominance that
1
2
E[u(w0−e2+ a˜
′)]+
1
2
E[u(w0−e1+ a˜)] >
1
2
E[u(w0−e1+ a˜
′)]+
1
2
E[u(w0−e2+ a˜)].(5)
Rearranging terms, we can write inequality (5) as
E[u(w0− e2 + a˜
′)]− E[u(w0− e2 + a˜)] > E[u(w0 − e1 + a˜
′)]− E[u(w0 − e1 + a˜)]. (6)
Since a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance and u(w) ∈ UN+1 ⊂ UN , we have
E[u(a˜′)] > E[u(a˜)]. Since p(e2) > p(e1), we multiply p(e2) to the left-hand side of inequality
(6) and p(e1) to the right-hand side of inequality (6) to yield
p(e2)E[u(w0− e2 + a˜
′)]− p(e1)E[u(w0 − e1 + a˜
′)]
> p(e2)E[u(w0− e2 + a˜)]− p(e1)E[u(w0− e1 + a˜)]
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≥ [1− p(e1)]E[u(w0− e1 + b˜)]− [1− p(e2)]E[u(w0− e2 + b˜)], (7)
where the last inequality follows from inequality (4). It follows from Eq. (2) that inequality
(7) is equivalent to g(e2) − g(e1) > 0. Hence, the single-crossing condition (3) is satisfied
for θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2. It then follows from Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem that e
∗
2 ≥ e
∗
1. 2
When a˜ has more N th-degree risk than a˜′ in the sense of Ekern (1980), it is straight-
forward to verify that e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1 if (−1)
N−1u(N)(w) > 0 and (−1)Nu(N+1)(w) > 0. Indeed,
Crainich et al. (2016) derive the same sufficient conditions using the traditional approach
that relies on the first- and second-order conditions for the DM’s decision problem.4 We
count on the alternative approach adopted from the theory of monotone comparative stat-
ics and risk apportionment. Proposition 1 shows that the sole driver is the single-crossing
condition (3) and not the first- and second-order conditions for the DM’s decision problem,
making the comparative statics results completely general.
Using the traditional approach, Chuang et al. (2013) derive necessary and sufficient
condition under which e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1 when a˜ has more N th-degree risk than a˜
′ in the sense of
Ekern (1980). Specifically, using our notation, we can state the condition of Chuang et al.
(2013) as follows:
−
u(N+1)(w0 − e
∗
1 + a)
u(N)(w0 − e
∗
1 + a)
> −
p′(e∗1)
p(e∗1)
, (8)
for all a ∈ [a, a]. Given that (−1)N−1u(N)(w) > 0 and (−1)Nu(N+1)(w) > 0, the left-
hand side of condition (8) becomes the N th-degree Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion (Caballe´ and Pomansky, 1996; Jindapon and Neilson, 2007), which is positive.
Hence, condition (8) holds and e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1. On the other hand, even when u
(N)(w) > 0
and u(N+1)(w) > 0, condition (8) may still hold provided that the left-hand side is less
negative relative to the right-hand side, thereby rendering e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1. As such, u(w) ∈ UN+1
is sufficient but not necessary for e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1 when a˜ experiences an improvement in risk to a˜
′
4It is well-known from the literature on effort that the second-order conditions for effort-choice problems
need not hold. See also Crainich et al. (2016).
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via N th-order stochastic dominance. It is evident from condition (8) that it depends on e∗1,
which is endogenously determined, thereby making condition (8) far less informative.
To see the underlying intuition for Proposition 1, we follow Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006) to define the utility premium for shifting the risk from a˜′ to a˜, where a˜′ dominates
a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance, as
pi(e) = p(e)E[u(w0− e+ a˜)]− p(e)E[u(w0− e+ a˜
′)]. (9)
The utility premium, pi(e), which is negative if, and only if, the DM’s utility function
satisfies that u(w) ∈ UN . As such, pi(e) measures the “pain” caused by the increase in risk
from a˜′ to a˜ in terms of the loss of expected utility. Differentiating Eq. (9) with respect to
e yields
pi′(e) = p′(e){E[u(w0− e+ a˜)]− E[u(w0 − e + a˜
′]}
−p(e){E[u′(w0 − e + a˜)]− E[u
′(w0 − e+ a˜
′)]}. (10)
The expression inside the curly brackets of the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (10)
is positive if, and only if, u(w) ∈ UN . The expression inside the curly brackets of the second
term on the right-hand side of Eq. (10) is negative if, and only if, u(w) ∈ UN+1. Since
p′(e) > 0, we conclude that pi′(e) < 0 if u(w) ∈ UN+1. The DM as such has less incentives
to spend on effort that leads him to the more risky target, thereby rendering that e∗1 ≤ e
∗
2.
4. Multiplicative risky targets and effort
In this section, we consider the case that the risky target and status quo are multiplica-
tive in nature so that the DM’s expected utility is given by
f(e) = p(e)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
)]
+ [1− p(e)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)b˜
)]
, (11)
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Let e∗1 be an element in argmaxe∈[0,w0] f(e). When the risky target, a˜, changes to a˜
′, where
a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance and N ≥ 1, the DM’s expected utility
becomes
g(e) = p(e)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
′
)]
+ [1− p(e)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)b˜
)]
. (12)
Let e∗2 be an element in argmaxe∈[0,w0] g(e).
Denote R(n)(w) = −wu(n+1)(w)/u(n)(w) as the nth-degree Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion. In the following proposition, we derive sufficient, but not necessary,
conditions under which the DM spends more on effort when the target becomes less risky,
i.e., e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1.
Proposition 2. Given that the risky situations are multiplicative in nature, and that the
risky target, a˜, experiences an improvement in risk to a˜′ via N th-order stochastic dominance,
the DM spends more on effort, i.e., e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1, if the DM’s utility function satisfies that
u(w) ∈ UN+1 and R
(n)(w) ≥ n for n = 1, ..., N .
Proof. Define f(e) = φ(e, 1) and g(e) = φ(e, 2). For all e2 > e1, it follows from Eq. (11)
that f(e2)− f(e1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
p(e2)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)a˜
)]
− p(e1)E{u[(w0− e1)a˜]}
≥ [1− p(e1)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)b˜
)]
− [1− p(e2)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)b˜
)]
. (13)
Since a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance and w0 − e1 dominates w0 − e2
via first-order stochastic dominance, Theorem 3 of Chiu et al. (2012) implies that the
DM prefers the 50-50 binary lottery, [(w0 − e2)a˜
′; (w0 − e1)a˜], to the 50-50 binary lottery,
[(w0 − e1)a˜
′; (w0 − e2)a˜], if u(x) ∈ UN+1 and R
(n)(w) ≥ n for n = 1, ..., N so that
1
2
E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)a˜
′
)]
+
1
2
E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)a˜
)]
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>
1
2
E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)a˜
′
)]
+
1
2
E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)a˜
)]
. (14)
Rearranging terms, we can write inequality (14) as
E
[
u
(
(w0− e2)a˜
′
)]
−E
[
u
(
(w0− e2)a˜
)]
> E
[
u
(
(w0− e1)a˜
′
)]
−E
[
u
(
(w0− e1)a˜
)]
.(15)
Since a˜′ dominates a˜ via N th-order stochastic dominance and u(w) ∈ UN+1 ⊂ UN , we have
E[u(a˜′)] > E[u(a˜)]. Since p(e2) > p(e1), we multiply p(e2) to the left-hand side of inequality
(15) and p(e1) to the right-hand side of inequality (15) to yield
p(e2)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)a˜
′
)]
− p(e1)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)a˜
′
)]
> p(e2)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)a˜
)]
− p(e1)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)a˜
)]
≥ [1− p(e1)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e1)b˜
)]
− [1− p(e2)]E
[
u
(
(w0 − e2)b˜
)]
, (16)
where the last inequality follows from inequality (13). It follows from Eq. (12) that in-
equality (16) is equivalent to g(e2)− g(e1) > 0. Hence, the single-crossing condition (3) is
satisfied for θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2. It then follows from Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem that
e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1. 2
When a˜ has more N th-degree risk than a˜′ in the sense of Ekern (1980), it is easily
verified that e∗2 ≥ e
∗
1 if (−1)
N−1u(N)(w) > 0, (−1)Nu(N+1)(w) > 0, and R(N)(w) ≥ N . To
see the underlying intuition for Proposition 2, we follow Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)
to define the utility premium for shifting the risk from a˜′ to a˜, where a˜′ dominates a˜ via
N th-order stochastic dominance, as
pi(e) = p(e)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
)]
− p(e)E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
′
)]
. (17)
The utility premium, pi(e), which is negative if, and only if, the DM’s utility function
satisfies that u(w) ∈ UN . As such, pi(e) measures the “pain” caused by the increase in risk
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from a˜′ to a˜ in terms of the loss of expected utility. Differentiating Eq. (17) with respect
to e yields
pi′(e) = p′(e)
{
E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
)]
− E
[
u
(
(w0 − e)a˜
′
)]}
−p(e)
{
E
[
u′
(
(w0 − e)a˜
)
a˜
]
− E
[
u′
(
(w0 − e)a˜
′
)
a˜′
]}
, (18)
The expression inside the curly brackets of the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (18)
is positive if, and only if, u(w) ∈ UN . According to Theorem 3 of Chiu et al. (2012), the
expression inside the curly brackets of the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (18)
is negative if u(w) ∈ UN+1 and R
(n)(w) ≥ n for n = 1, ..., N . Since p′(e) > 0, we conclude
that pi′(e) < 0 if u(w) ∈ UN+1 and R
(n)(w) ≥ n for n = 1, ..., N . The DM as such has
less incentives to spend on effort that leads him to the more risky target, thereby rendering
that e∗1 ≤ e
∗
2.
5. Conclusion
In this note, we revisit the effort choice problem of a decision maker (DM) who has to
meet a target, as developed by Chuang et al. (2013). The more the DM spends on effort,
the more likely the target is reached. Besides the risk of missing the target despite his
effort, the DM faces additional uncertainty in that both the target and the status quo are
subject to exogenous shocks that are beyond the DM’s control. We consider two cases: the
additive case in which the DM’s effort affects solely the likelihood of achieving the target,
and the multiplicative case in which the DM’s effort also has direct effect on the target and
the status quo. Using the theory of monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon,
1994) and risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006; Eeckhoudt et al., 2009;
Chiu et al., 2012), we derive sufficient conditions under which the DM spends more on effort
when the target experiences an improvement in risk via higher-order stochastic dominance.
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